Looking Back
The right way to read this election is in proper historical context and not against the relativistic markers that are being set-up by superficial, media driven analysis. Indeed, the most remarkable thing about this presidential election is the utter unremarkability of its result despite the apparent uniqueness of the circumstances that surrounded it.
Despite Senator Obama’s race, name, and fundraising, Senator McCain’s age, Governor Palin’s sex, and the existence of Joe the plumber, Senator Obama won almost precisely as many votes as most professional forecasting models predicted he would at the start of the summer. Among these, Alan Abramowitz's "time for change" forecasting model predicts over 90% of the observed variance in post-WWII presidential election results (two party popular vote) ont the basis of only three variables: the length of time an incumbent party has held office, economic growth, and incumbent presidential popularity.
Each of these three key variables were working against Senator McCain’s campaign, and I discuss them in turn below.
1. Incumbency
There are definite cycles and swing in American public opinion, at least since World War II, which translate into swings in the electoral fortunes of Republicans and Democrats as the country’s mood changes over time. In particular, the ideological tenor of public opinion tends to move against the party in power. Explanations for this range from impressionistic “time for change” approaches to more precise “thermostatic models.” Whatever the reason, though, the electoral result at the presidential level is clear, two-term partisan presidential cycles are the norm and have been since President Eisenhower replaced President Truman. The only exceptions to this rule of thumb are associated with Ronald Reagan: i.e. President Carter’s defeat in 1980 and Vice President Bush’s victory in 1988.
Senator McCain could not help the timing of his campaign in this cycle. Senator Obama’s campaign maximized the electoral benefit of this dynamic by emphasizing “change” as a campaign theme. However, claims to “do something different” were principally effective because of their employment in relative to cyclical dynamics which were pushing the country towards the Democratic Party in any event.
2. Economic Growth
Milton Friedman wrote that government efforts to influence real economic growth are unpredictable and, at best, work with “long and variable lags.” Nevertheless, voters are apt to hold presidents and presidential candidates of the incumbent party accountable for the state of the macro economy. Moreover, most voters have short memories when it comes to judging presidents in terms of the economy. Thus, a fresh recession along with reasonable prospects for a lengthy contraction is the worst possible recipe for an incumbent party presidential candidate. Senator McCain’s campaign faced both.
In the long-run, developing a reasonable conservative public prescription to limit the extent and duration of the current economic downturn is obviously important. Yet, policy proposals were largely irrelevant to the election in the short run. The “punish” incumbents dynamic of aggregate voter behavior in an economic downturn is largely immune to distinctions between left and right economic policies. Thus, the election results should not be viewed as either a rejection of conservative, pro-growth economic policies or an endorsement of redistributive populism. Instead, they are an irrational assignment of blame.
3. President Bush
The lack of support for President Bush is the final important structural element of Senator McCain’s defeat and, perhaps, the problem which raises the greatest prospective challenge to the Republican Party. While scholars will spend years dissecting the Bush presidency, there is convincing preliminary evidence that the public’s rejection of the administration stems principally from its ownership of the war in Iraq and the growth of antipathy towards the war. Despite the objective merits of the war and its many military and political successes, the failure to produce evidence of the Iraqi weapons program which justified the war a priori and the inadequacy of early counter-insurgency efforts—which were ultimately remedied by the surge—doomed the war in the public’s mind, particularly as the human and financial costs of the war accumulated over time. Together, these elements created an impression of managerial ineptitude, which was almost certainly compounded by the handling of Hurricane Katrina, the nomination of Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court, and the US Attorney firing scandal, among others.
Importantly, though, there is little evidence that the country rejected the ideological elements of President Bush’s domestic policy programs above and beyond the sort of “time for change” fatigue that is typically observed at the end of any president’s second term. Politically important opposition to President Bush—i.e. opposition from malleable moderate elements of the electorate—is largely a function of perceived incompetence. All else equal (i.e. given the war), there is a high probability that President Bush would have been just as (un)popular had he pursued other domestic policies that were more conservative or oriented towards reducing the size and scope of government, etc., but he would have been no less popular.
Looking Forward
This analysis suggests that the election results should not be read for ideological content. President Bush is not unpopular because he is conservative, nor did Senator McCain lose because he is too conservative. Instead, the country predictably signaled for a change in party control of government.
Taking the view that presidential election results are typically exogenous to party platforms, campaigns, and other acts of individual agency indicates a certain level of realism in preparing for the future. There is no silver bullet, and Republicans are unlikely to regain control of the White House in 2012. Barring a “sticky” Carter-like period of economic decline (a possible but unlikely outcome), the economy will be in recovery during the 2012 election cycle—which will benefit President Obama’s reelection bid—while “time for change” dynamics will not yet be ripe.
In any event, the best way forward for the Republican Party is to set itself up to take advantage of the historical cycles of American electoral behavior to maximize its cyclical advantages and produce important conservative policy changes that cannot easily be undone. In other words, election victories will come and go independent of most of our efforts. The object to win elections contra larger political cycles is counterproductive. A more important and meaningful approach follows from leveraging victories, when they come, into strategic conservative policy changes that will accumulate over time moving America back to a more traditional, small government course.
Short Term: 2010
The first opportunity to leverage these cyclical advantages will come in the 2010 midterm elections. Despite some recent exceptions, the party of the president usually suffers a net decline of seats in Congress during off-year elections. This provides a realistic opportunity for the Republican Party to regain control of the House and reduce the Democratic majority in the Senate in the very near term.
This national cyclical advantage should be supplemented in four ways:
- Aggressive candidate recruitment: The pool of quality potential congressional candidates for the GOP should be quite large. In particular, the drawdown of the American military presence in Iraq will make a pool of new veterans—largely inclined to conservative politics—available.
- Web-based fundraising through bundling PACs: Traditional bundling PACs accept and forward paper checks to listed candidates. A smart web-based bundling PAC could allow donors to initiate a single transaction on the PAC’s website that would be forwarded electronically to list candidates per the donors' instructions.
- A young ground game: Colleges and universities are enormous pools of high quality, low cost, and eager political talent. Creative efforts to transport, house, and support college students as canvassers and phone-bank workers for targeted congressional races could help overcome the chronic lack of labor that make sophisticated GOTV efforts difficult for many congressional campaigns.
- A new “Contract with America”: The evidence suggests that issues play a limited role in campaign outcomes. But, the perception of the role of issues in an election outcome can be very important for developing claims of a mandate to enact policy changes after the election. Within some limits, a strong policy platform is unlikely to either help or hurt a national campaign for Congress. But, it can help provide a launching pad to actually enact conservative policies, particularly over the objections of a sitting President Obama. Some potential items might include:
- A balanced budget amendment that includes requirements for reasonable debt payment timetables
- Income tax simplification to make one-page filing a reality and increase transparency
- Income tax reduction on the first $10,000 of income from interest and dividends to encourage savings and investment
- Healthcare reforms to allow doctors to charge on a sliding scale without risking reduced payments from insurance companies.
- Strong web use privacy laws limiting the type of information that websites can collect and store about users
Intermediate Term: 2012
Conditions for a Republican presidential victory in 2012 are unlikely to materialize. However, evidence of slow economic growth or continued recession and, perhaps, important foreign policy or military errors (akin to the Iranian hostage taking during the Carter administration) combined with a Republican candidate with substantial objective managerial competence will have a nontrivial chance at success.
A number of plausible candidates meet these conditions including Sarah Palin, Mitt Romney, Bobby Jindal, Mike Huckabee, and General David Petraeus (should he have political aspirations in civilian life). Since there is little historical data to adjudicate among these choices, I will refrain from speculating on their respective merits except to note that each of these candidates has a background as a governor or high-ranking military officer and that these executive backgrounds are probably most aptly symbolic of the competence that a 2012 victory would demand.
In any event, 2012 is likely to be most consequential as part of an ongoing effort to re-establish Republic parity with Democratic fundraising and voter mobilization. These efforts deserve high priority in any long-term planning.
Long term: 2016
Though it seems far-off, the historical data suggests that 2016 will be the Republican Party’s most favorable point for returning to the presidency. The long time horizon prohibits meaningful speculation about specific personalities or issues that will be ripe for the effort. However, it is important that the cyclical advantage that Republicans will enjoy should be reinforced at the margins by a strong, national infrastructure of web-based fundraising and network-driven GOTV efforts.
Also, Republicans should come to the 2016 election with a clear “Contract with America” style platform of specific policy proposals that link presidential leadership with a congressional commitment to act. This target is unlikely to be helpful in winning the election beyond the cyclical trends that will advantage Republicans. Rather, the document will provide a credible claim of an electoral mandate for the changes endorsed by the platform.
